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ABSTRACT.
Myanmar’s peace process is often viewed in light of the country’s wider political transition. While 
this prism seems intuitive, it misses the impacts of powerful geopolitical interests from China, 
ailand and India that have started to transform Myanmar’s restive but strategically-located 
borderlands from peripheries into hubs of regional connectivity, trade and development. is paper 
sheds light on the divergent eects that these economic forces have on dynamics of war and peace: 
On the one hand, they provide an inroad for crude pacication and partial state territorialisation in 
areas formerly o limits. On the other hand, they instigate new dynamics of armed resistance among 
ethnic insurgency movements. is puts the success of Myanmar’s peace process as well as the 
development aspirations of neighbouring regional powers in doubt. By comparing the ways in which 
economic transformations have driven dynamics of conict and violence in the Karen and Kachin 
borderlands, the paper identies one of the key problems of Myanmar’s peace process in the 
misconception that securitised, economic development can override long-standing ethnonational 
ideologies, ethnic discrimination, and socio-political grievances.
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Myanmar’s unique geography amidst South, East, and Southeast Asia has turned the impoverished 
country into a hotspot of regional infrastructure investment by neighbouring governments and 
development agencies. e country’s peripheral but strategically located borderlands are often 
regarded as the potential hub for regional connectivity and economic integration. What frequently 
goes missing in such development visions is that Myanmar’s border areas are also home to one of the 
world’s longest, ongoing civil wars between a dazzling array of ethnonational insurgency movements 
and an ethnocratic state. e conict, however, is commonly seen as a waning issue of the past, 
which will soon yield to the new geopolitical realities of development and prosperity. Underlying 
this presumption is an economistic reading of conict that claims economic growth will override 
ethnic demands and political grievances. Escalating conict in areas of large-scale infrastructure 
investment and development along the China-Myanmar border, however, challenge the validity of 
this logic.
 
By tracing the impacts of top-down, securitised development initiatives on local dynamics of conict 
and violence, this paper shows that economic forces have divergent eects on Myanmar’s restive 
hinterlands. On the one hand, they constitute an inroad for crude pacication and partial state 
territorialisation in formerly o-limits areas. On the other hand, they instigate new dynamics of 
armed resistance among ethnic insurgency movements, which casts the success of Myanmar’s peace 
process as well as wider development aspirations into doubt. Zooming in on the country’s insurgent 
Kachin and Karen borderlands with China and ailand, this paper argues that one of the key 
problems of Myanmar’s peace process is the misconception that securitised economic development 
can override long-running ethnonational projects. To develop this argument, the paper proceeds in 
two parts. It will rst provide an overview of geopolitical interests and economic transformations in 
Myanmar’s border areas, where economic development has long merged with agendas of state 
territorialisation and counterinsurgency. Building on this, the paper will trace how this has impacted 
on dynamics of conict and peace by comparing the ways in which economic transformations 
sparked new instances of resistance in the Kachin and Karen border areas.1 
2. GEO-ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATIONS: THE FRONTIERS OF ASIA’S ‘FINAL FRONTIER’.
Myanmar lies at the epicentre of geopolitical transformations in contemporary Southeast Asia. Not 
only has Sino-American geostrategic competition in Myanmar intensied since the country 
re-established relations with the West following transition to semi-civilian government in 2011 
(Haacke, 2012, 2015; Han, 2017). Sandwiched in between the region’s auent economies of 
China, India, and ailand, Myanmar has also aroused the development imaginations of 
governments and development agencies. is has inspired China’s ‘look south’ strategy, India’s ‘look 
east’ strategy as well as motivated development policies of regional organisations, such as the Asian 
Development Bank. e main goal is to foster commerce and regional economic integration by 
1. is paper is based on nine months of eld work, which has been conducted between 2013 and 2014 as part of my PhD 
research. Please see chapter three of my thesis for a detailed discussion of research methods (Brenner, 2016).
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increasing connectivity through ‘the Myanmar connection’ (Chachavalpongpun, 2011, p. 102; 
Steinberg and Fan, 2012, pp. 280-96; Asian Development Bank, 2010).
 
Such grand visions are redolent of age-old imaginations about Myanmar’s geostrategic relevance; as 
in the Second World War, when Myanmar became conceived as the ‘gateway to China’, manifested 
in the ‘Burma Road’ built by Allied forces to supply Chinese nationalist troops ghting the Japanese 
(cf. Deignan, 1943). ey also dovetail with the view from Naypyidaw. In his book Where China 
meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia, Myanmar historian ant Myint-U provides a 
window into the geopolitical self-understanding of that uniquely situated country (ant Myint-U, 
2011). ant Myint-U is the grandson of UN General Secretary U ant and special advisor to the 
Union Peace Working Committee (formerly Myanmar Peace Centre) of the government of 
Myanmar. He believes geography is the key to unleashing Myanmar’s full potential:  
is transformation of Myanmar into a hub of regional connectivity is already underway in the form 
of major infrastructure construction, including pipelines and roads. China has built a twin pipeline 
to transport both gas and crude oil from Myanmar’s Rakhine State to China’s landlocked Yunnan 
province in order to circumvent vulnerable shipping lanes through the Strait of Malacca and the 
disputed South China Sea (Hornby, 2017). Another gas pipeline between Myanmar and ailand 
has been in operation since the late 1990s, when a Total-led consortium began supplying ailand’s 
natural gas needs with a pipeline from the Gulf of Martaban to ailand by way of Myanmar’s 
south-eastern Tenasserim district (Kolås, 2007, p. 628). Myanmar is also located at the centre of a 
major Asian Development Bank-funded, transnational road network which is meant to turn 
Myanmar into the ‘key link between South Asia and Southeast Asia’ (Florento and Corpuz, 2014; 
Asian Development Bank, 2010).
 
e rehabilitation and expansion of Myanmar’s crippled infrastructure is also pivotal to the 
development of Southeast Asia’s poorest country itself, which became the world’s fastest growing 
economy in 2016 with an estimated GDP growth rate of 8.6 per cent (IMF, 2016). At rst glance, 
thus, the country appears to t the view of international investors, depicting it as Asia’s “nal 
frontier”’ (Parker, 2016). An important point that is generally missed from such geo-economic 
imaginaries, however, is that the actual frontiers of Asia’s ‘nal frontier’ are far from stable. 
Myanmar’s borderlands are not only the bridge between South, East, and Southeast Asia, they are 
also home to some of the world’s longest, ongoing insurgencies. Most of these have taken up arms as 
ethnonational movements against an ethnocratic, post-independence state that failed to guarantee 
equal rights and autonomy for the variegated mosaic of ethnic minority groups that inhabit its 
far-ung peripheries. 
When geography changes, old patterns of contact may disappear and new ones take hold, turning 
strangers into neighbours, and transforming backwaters into zones of strategic signicance. (ant 
Myint-U, 2011, p. 3)
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While the heyday of insurgency in Myanmar has passed, armed conict persists in many parts these 
border regions, most of which have escaped state control up until today. In their quest for 
independence, the larger movements that can command up to several thousand men have 
established fairly sophisticated quasi-states in their own domains with parallel governance systems 
capable of generating tax revenue and providing public goods. Many smaller militias also operate on 
Myanmar’s borders. Some of them ght for the government; others operate as armed criminal gangs 
(Smith, 1999, pp. 27-100). is complex situation is reected in the circumstance that the exact 
number of Myanmar’s non-state armed groups (let alone of their combatants) is unknown and in 
constant ux. e following, non-exhaustive map demarcates the areas of operation of the most 
important non-state armed groups in Myanmar (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Non-state armed groups in Myanmar’s borderlands. Ethnic armed insurgency groups are shown in 
colour while pro-government militias are shown in grey. e map is not exhaustive (Source: Burma News 
International, 2014, p. 45).
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In the grand visions of regional governments and development agencies armed conict will soon 
yield to the new geopolitical realities of economic development, regional integration and state 
consolidation. Southeast Asian states, including Malaysia, ailand or Vietnam, have indeed long 
sought to territorialise their own frontiers by ‘developing’ their ethnic minorities with ‘civilising 
projects’ that combine economic development, educational initiatives, and forced resettlement 
programmes (Duncan, 2004, p. 7). A similar logic of ‘peace-creating prosperity’ also seems to 
underpin India’s contemporary Look East policy (Das, 2016, p. 5). A report on India-Myanmar 
border trade, for instance, states that fostering regional economic integration by way of 
infrastructure construction is expected to bring peace to India’s own conict-ridden north-eastern 
provinces:
 
is rationale is deeply rooted in Myanmar whose government has merged economic development 
with counterinsurgency since the 1990s. Since then the country’s military – the Tatmadaw – has 
become the main development actor in Myanmar’s restive border provinces, where it heads the 
‘Program for the Progress of the Border Areas and National Races Development’. First introduced in 
1989, this top-down development programme has later been renamed as the Ministry of Border 
Aairs. Locally known as Na Ta La, the ministry remains under direct military control despite the 
semi-civilian transition in other parts of government. Its stated objective is to ‘develop’ ethnic 
minority regions, mainly through the expansion of physical infrastructure and the state bureaucracy 
itself (Lambrecht, 2008; Jones 2014).
 
In addition, Myanmar’s counterinsurgency planners have long used economic incentives in their 
attempt to pacify ethnic insurgencies. Since the late 1980s, the securitised development programmes 
with which the Tatmadaw managed to expand into territory formerly o limits were accompanied 
by bilateral ceasere agreements with various rebel groups. ese pacts allowed insurgents to retain 
their arms and govern pockets of territory in newly established special administrative regions, most 
of which were located on the Chinese border. Moreover, the state has granted the leaders of ceasere 
groups lucrative business concessions (Smith, 1999, pp. 421-441). Many former rebel leaders have 
since proted from various ventures – especially mining and logging – and have gradually 
established close working relationships with their former enemy in what has become known as 
‘ceasere capitalism’ (Woods, 2011; Sherman, 2003, p. 234). e relative stability that followed 
sparked an unprecedented wave of investment in Myanmar’s northern border areas with China, 
mostly in natural resources (Buchanan et al., 2013, p. 28). 
While Myanmar’s ceasere politics have ostensibly provided ‘a successful – if crude – tool for conict 
resolution’ and state consolidation for many years (Sherman, 2003, p. 246), previous ceaseres at the 
Regional economic integration needs to focus simultaneously on both peace and prosperity. is is 
particularly important for economic regionalism among developing countries. e causality between 
peace and prosperity runs in both the directions. While the obvious narrative has remained where 
peace precedes prosperity, it may be time that the ‘reverse causality’ is focused whereby enabling 
condition for economic prosperity is created through economic integration to achieve peace. (Das, 
2016, p. 5)
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Chinese border have broken down since the country embarked on a transition process in 2011. As 
matters currently stand, government forces are battling a determined alliance of previous ceasere 
groups – the Kachin, Kokang and Palaung movements – resulting in heavy losses on both sides and 
the displacement of up to 150,000 civilians in Shan and Kachin States (Lintner, 2017). is 
re-escalation of conict reveals the pitfalls of an economistic reading of political violence and the 
next section will trace how economic forces have sparked new dynamics of conict and violence. 
3. VIOLENCE: FRAGMENTATION AND RESISTANCE. 
To shed light on the non-linear impacts that increased economic transformations have on 
ethnonational conict in Myanmar’s border areas, the second part of this paper compares the 
trajectories of two of Myanmar’s oldest and strongest ethnic armies: the Kachin Independence 
Organisation (KIO) on the Chinese border and the Karen National Union (KNU) on the ai 
border. On the face of it, the trajectories of both groups contradict each other: the KIO was the most 
important ceasere movement of the 1990s, seeking for compromise with Myanmar’s generals until 
the breakdown of its ceasere in 2011. During these years the KNU spearheaded an increasingly 
dwindling camp of ethnic armed groups that remained locked in combat with the Tatmadaw despite 
devastating setbacks. Today this constellation is turned on its head. e KNU champions the 
nationwide peace process, seeking for active conciliation with Naypyidaw, while the KIO returned 
back to the trenches, leading a new coalition of ethnic armed groups into battles heftier than any 
other that northern Myanmar has seen since the late 1980s. While the strategies of both movements 
seem contradictory from the outside, they were driven by similar processes of organisational 
fragmentation and internal contestation, both of which are directly related to economic 
transformations in their respective border regions. 
3.1 e Kachin Borderlands
Several factors led to the collapse of the Kachin ceasere in 2011. Importantly, the state sought to 
consolidate its presence along the Chinese border by bringing ceasere movements under direct 
Tatmadaw control as Border Guard Force (BGF) militias beginning in 2008. e BGF programme 
aimed to legalise ceasere groups as militias in exchange for institutionalised subordination to 
Tatmadaw command (Jones, 2014). After years of ceasere and elite collaboration, the KIO did not, 
however, agree to this initiative. In fact, by that time a new rebel leadership had begun already to 
reject much of its predecessors’ conciliatory stance. After having consented to the 2008 constitution, 
the KIO now ercely opposes it, demanding federal reforms and political autonomy for ethnic 
minority groups instead. e KIO has also started to raise concerns about joint Myanmar-Chinese 
infrastructure projects in the region, an issue it had silently condoned before. Just before the collapse 
of the ceasere in 2011, the new KIO leadership called for an end to the construction of the 
Myitsone mega-dam in Kachin State in an open letter to China's then-President Hu Jintao, warning 
that the project’s impacts on local communities could spark full-blown civil war (Kachin 
Independence Organisation, 2011). 
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is was puzzling as individual Kachin leaders have previously collaborated with Tatmadaw 
frontline commanders as well as foreign and domestic businessmen. For many years since the 1994 
ceasere, the movement’s military strength and revolutionary agendas had seemed permanently in 
abeyance (cf. Sherman, 2003). To understand why the movement recovered its former resolve, 
capacity, and popularity, it is necessary to trace the eects which the business arrangements and 
securitised development agendas of the local elites have had on other elements of the movement. 
While the rapid expansion of unsustainable resource exploitation (especially jade, teak, and gold) 
proted individual elites on all sides, it sparked signicant organisational fragmentation and internal 
contestation within the Kachin movement (Global Witness, 2009). Inter-generational grievances – 
between young and old ocers - and inter-organisational divides – between the political and 
military wing of the organisation - delineated the main fault lines along which an internal 
opposition materialised in the early 2000s (Brenner, 2015).
is happened because civilian departments in the KIO expanded during the ceasere years and 
individual leaders proted, whereas the loser of this transformation was the organisation’s armed 
wing: the KIA. Whilst its senior commanders capitalised on the ceasere economy, defections and 
low morale withered the KIA’s base away. Witnessing their superiors’ self-enrichment, inghting and 
amicable ties with the Tatmadaw as well as experiencing their own inability to protect Kachin 
civilians, the morale within the middle and lower ranks of the KIA plummeted. ese developments 
gave rise to a new faction within the KIA, which was comprised of young ocers led by Brig. Gun 
Maw and Gen. Gam Shawng. Ranked in the middle of a top-down military organisation in a strictly 
age-based traditional society, these young ocers were alienated by the rampant corruption of their 
superiors, from whose sources of power and wealth they were excluded. Faced with the rapid 
disintegration of their movement, they set out to change this unpromising situation by rebuilding 
authority among their grassroots support networks (Brenner, 2015, 2017b). 
eir eorts were aided by the fact that the Kachin ceasere did not address long-standing, 
underlying grievances about ethnic and political marginalisation that has motivated generations of 
Kachin people to take up arms against the government. In addition, ‘ceasere capitalism’ created 
new grievances as the wealth enjoyed by some individual Kachin leaders and crony businessmen did 
not trickle down to the masses (Woods, 2011). Far from it, the settlement did not mean an end to 
physical insecurities for many Kachin despite an end to direct warfare. Unsustainable mining and 
logging rather brought large-scale environmental degradation, land grabs, militarisation, and yet 
more forced displacement in many areas of Kachin State (Global Witness, 2009, 2015). is planted 
the seed of new grievances in local communities and the Kachin movement, which were now not 
only directed against the Myanmar government but also against the old KIO leaders that were 
perceived to be corrupt. ese developments were fertile ground for the emerging faction of young 
leaders to eventually seize control by rallying against their old guard’s conciliatory stance and 
remobilising popular insurgency on a large scale (Brenner, 2015).
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3.2 e Karen Borderlands
e KNU signed a ceasere in January 2012. It has since spearheaded the ocial peace process with 
the government. In contrast to analyses of Myanmar’s ceasere capitalism of the 1990s and 2000s, 
political economy dynamics have featured less prominently in accounts on the Karen ceasere and 
other such agreements since Myanmar’s political transition. Indeed, outside observers have mostly 
interpreted the ‘new wave’ of ceaseres as a direct result of wider political reforms (International 
Crisis Group 2011; Burke, 2012). A closer look, however, reveals that the Karen ceasere is 
dominated by a similar business-like approach to conict management than previous ceaseres in 
Myanmar (Ruzza, 2015). is is not least because large parts of the Karen borderlands have 
witnessed signicant commercialisation with regards to resource exploitation, border trade, and 
infrastructure developments (Brenner, 2017a). While the politico-economic changes on the ai 
border were less fast paced during the 1990s than parallel development at the Chinese border, they 
have become more prominent since the turn of the millennium (Karen Human Rights Group, 2014, 
2015). Unsurprisingly then, ‘ceasere capitalism’ is alive and well. Crony businessmen have, for 
instance, promoted and nanced the ceasere negotiations between the KNU and Naypyidaw. 
Agreeable KNU leaders have also been rewarded with business concessions and valuable licenses to 
import cars from ailand (Lintner, 2013, 2017). 
ese new economic realities on the ai border have severed organisational fragmentation within 
the KNU and sparked internal contestation between a pro-ceasere leadership and an internal 
opposition. In fact, contemporary factional contestation in the Karen movement is directly related 
to transforming border economies. Most importantly, an ever liberalising regime with ailand has 
undercut the rebels’ revenues from illicit border trade. In addition, infrastructure construction and 
military oensives allowed the state to cut deep inside the KNU’s ‘liberated areas’ (Smith 1999, pp. 
99,283). ese processes had divergent impacts on the movement, weakening central and southern 
brigades 4, 6 and 7 in particular. Having previously controlled the main smuggle routes to ailand, 
these units lost most of their revenues, territory, military strength and support networks (South 
2011, pp. 18-21). In contrast, the northern units of the KNU – brigades 5 and 2 – have remained 
relatively isolated and emerged as the last stronghold of the Karen insurgency. In comparison to their 
central and southern comrades, northern KNU rebels have maintained comparatively strong control 
of territory and close relations with local communities (Brenner 2017a, 2017b). 
ese developments have, in turn, given rise to two competing factions in the KNU leadership and 
their diverging strategies towards the state, the movement’s ceasere and the current peace process. 
e rapprochement with the government was led by central brigade leaders who sought to 
compensate for their declining power and authority. Indeed, Gen Mutu Say Poe was previously the 
leader of Brigade 6 and Vice-Chairman Saw Kwe Htoo Win was KNU District Chairman in the area 
of Brigade 4 at a time when its units had to give way to a large-scale Tatmadaw oensive along the 
corridor of the Yadana pipeline in the late 1990s. e internal opposition surrounding former 
vice-chairperson Naw Zipporah Sein is supported by the movement’s northern brigade. Her main 
supporter is the group’s Vice-Chief of Sta Gen Baw Kyah Heh, who was previously the long-term 
leader of Brigade 5 (Brenner 2017a).
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Despite losing ocial leadership positions in the 2017 KNU Congress elections, the internal 
opposition within the KNU is thus still backed by formidable units of the movement’s armed wing. 
Importantly, it also draws support from across many local Karen communities and the Karen civil 
society on the ai border (Brenner, 2017b). e latter’s position was claried in an open letter 
signed by 41 Karen civil society organisations, which expressed distrust in the nationwide ceasere 
agreement and the top KNU leadership. It stated that a ‘small group of KNU leaders […] refuse to 
heed the concerns and voices of other Karen leaders, of civil society organizations, of community 
groups and the local people whom they claim to represent’ (41 Karen Civil Society Organisations, 
2015). ese deep internal divisions create signicant risks of further fragmentation and hence a 
collapse of the current ceasere and peace process.
e reasons why many Karen civilian and rank-and-le insurgents support less appeasing elements 
within the KNU, despite having borne the brunt of decades-long armed conict, is strikingly similar 
to what was observed in Kachin State. Notwithstanding the end of ghting, the everyday lives of 
many civilians in ceasere areas are still aicted by militarisation, forced displacement, and 
uncompensated land grabs, most often at the hands of army and militia soldiers, who coercively clear 
the land for mining operations, agro-businesses, infrastructure development, and military facilities 
(Karen Human Rights Group, 2014, 2015; Karen Peace Support Network, 2014). Coupled with 
Myanmar’s long history of merging top-down development initiatives with securitised state 
territorialisation, this has led to a situation where many Karen have come to perceive ‘development 
as a weapon’.2
4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
is paper has presented a reading of Myanmar’s ethnic conict against the backdrop of geopolitical 
transformations in the country’s far-ung border areas, including increased regional integration, 
economic development and commercical activities. By tracing the impacts of economic forces on 
local processes of violence, it cautions about overly optimistic visions that view economic 
development as the panacea for solving the country’s decades-old ethnonational conicts. To be sure, 
socio-economic marginalisation interacts with identity politics in driving conict in Myanmar as 
elsewhere. at said, economic incentives cannot simply override the deep-rooted political and 
ethnic grievances of a protracted identity conict, as is wished for in the development imaginaries of 
regional governments and development agencies. My ndings demonstrate that economic 
transformation enables crude pacication and partial state territorialisation in borderlands formerly 
o limits. At the same time, the geo-economic forces at play in Myanmar also instigate new 
dynamics of armed resistance, particularly by driving processes of fragmentation and contestation 
within ethnic insurgency movements.
 
In order to address the shortcomings of current development policies it thus, seems necessary to 
design more conict-sensitive development interventions as well as to address the root problems of 
2. Interview with Karen development practitioner working for a major international development agency, 6 October 2015. 
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conict in Myanmar. Instead of top-down, securitised infrastructure construction and unsustainable 
resource extraction, Myanmar’s government, neighbouring states and international development 
actors should prioritise the development of regulatory frameworks and implementation mechanisms 
regarding environmental and labour safeguards in the mining, logging, agro-business, and 
construction industries. e communal system of land ownership in ethnic minority areas also needs 
legal recognition against the background of historically missing government deeds and large-scale 
forced displacement. In addition, an eective public nance system has to tax and redistribute the 
abundant excess prots made by resource exploitation to the benets of communities from which 
this wealth is extracted.3
Most importantly Myanmar’s peace process must address the underlying grievances of ethnic 
minority communities by building political institutions that allow for eective regional power and 
resource sharing, cultural and political autonomy, provisions for minority rights, security guarantees 
to demobilising armed movements, and a security sector reform that subjects the Tatmadaw to 
civilian control. As elites from all sides have been deeply involved in exploiting the riches of ethnic 
areas, direct engagement with all warring factions is necessary but not sucient in this process. In 
order to break out of the cycle of violence, close collaboration with local civil society is of utmost 
importance. Its members have fought against unsustainable development and commerce for many 
years and express deep dissatisfaction with the prevailing economistic outlook of development 
planners, which ignores that ethnonational conict is foremost rooted in the denial of separate 
identities and the aspiration for political self-determination. To conclude with, the following analysis 
expresses this in the words of local civil society activists from the Karen Peace Support Network:
ere appears to be an implicit belief that poverty is a key driver of conict in the southeast, and that 
industrial development is therefore the solution. We acknowledge that there are complex relationships 
between poverty and conict, but in this case poverty is not the underlying cause. e Karen people’s 
central demand throughout the conict has been protection of human rights and autonomy. ese 
demands do not reect a focus on economics but rather on our right to our culture and control over 
our own lives, natural resources and land (Karen Peace Support Network, 2014, p. 11).
3. For an excellent discussion on the institutional reform needs of Myanmar’s economy see Gabusi (2015).
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